THE IMPACTS OF THE CHINESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW ON IP
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ABSTRACT
After thirteen years of discussion and three revisions, China’s
Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) was promulgated on August 30, 2007
and has come into effect on August 1, 2008. It is the first antimonopoly law in China and has been viewed as an “economic
constitution” and a “milestone of the country’s efforts in promoting
a fair competition market and cracking down on monopoly
activities.” However, the wording of some provisions of the AML,
including the sections dealing with Intellectual Property (IP)
protection, is not very clear. And juridical interpretations and more
specific implementing regulations on the AML have not yet
appeared. This has led to a lot of uncertainty for the operations of
foreign enterprises, particularly IP related enterprises in China.
This iBrief will provide an overview of possible impacts of the AML
on the IP protection and commercialization in China. First, it will
provide a brief overview of the AML, including both major
compliments and criticism. Second, it will examine both
opportunities and potential legal risks of foreign IP holders and
investors when operating in China, particularly focusing on the
impacts of Article 55, the IP-related provision. Thirdly, it will
provide some practical suggestions and strategies for foreign IP
holders and technology-driven companies to operate in China, such
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as some useful defenses for potential IP lawsuits. Finally, it will
provide some suggestions for future interpretation and
implementation of Article 55 in the AML by drawing on lessons
from the experiences of the United States and the European Union.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
The interrelationship between intellectual property and anti-trust
law has been one of the central issues in international intellectual property
debates for many years. Intellectual Property (IP) law grants a monopoly
that enables rights holders to prevent others from commercializing products
or services that make use of their IP. 2 In doing so, rights holders can
exclusively explore their IP for a period of time, and thereby justify and
recoup “their often substantial investment in research and development” of
their products or services. 3 By contrast, anti-trust/competition law is
designed to stop monopolistic conduct and to safeguard a fair competition
order of the market.
¶2
However, IP laws and competition laws also have certain common
aims, particularly in terms of promoting innovation and enhancing
consumer welfare. 4 IP laws have been based on the premise that limited
monopoly rights will enhance innovation, progress of science, and public
welfare. 5 IP laws enable Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) holders to
exclusively explore the market value of their IP for limited times so rights
holders can recoup their investment cost, thereby incentivizing further
innovation. Without effective IP laws, widespread piracy will reduce the
value of investment of IP holders and result in “slower rates of economic
progress and reduced consumer welfare.” 6 Competition and anti-trust laws
have been based on the premise that competition is the “best way to ensure

2

Kirstie Nicholson & Zirou Liu, Avoid competition problems in China,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., July/August 2008,
http://www.managingip.com/Article/1968516/Avoid-competition-problems-inChina.html.
3
James F. Rill & Mark C. Schechter, International Anti-trust and Intellectual
Property Harmonization of the Interface, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 783, 783
(2003).
4
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTI-TRUST
ENFORCEMENT & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION 1 (2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf [hereinafter 2007
Report].
5
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (explicitly empowering Congress “to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
6
Rill & Schechter, supra note 3, at 783.
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that consumers and other users receive maximum innovation and quality at
the lowest possible prices.” 7
¶3
It is therefore possible for IP rights to exist within the permitted
boundaries of competition laws; however, when IP holders’ actions go
beyond the legitimate IP protection, competition concerns may arise.8 Thus,
it is important to strike a sound balance between IP protection and fair
market competition in order to make IP laws and anti-trust laws work
collaboratively to achieve their legislative goals (that is, enhancing
innovation, consumer protection, and pubic welfare). This is particularly
true in the current globalized knowledge economy. On the one hand, overly
strong IP laws may limit competition and lead to monopoly prices, which
may limit the public’s access to IP assets. This will not only limit the
public’s capability of making further innovation, but also have negative
impacts on the progress of sciences and the sustainable growth of the
national economy. On the other hand, overly strong competition laws may
restrict the protection and exercise of IP rights. This may limit the
distribution of IP products and services, and have negative impacts on IPrelated international trade, and, ultimately, the “rate of progress toward
creation of a single global economy.” 9

This paper will focus on the newly enacted Chinese anti-monopoly
law and its impacts on both IP protection and the operations of IP-relevant
foreign enterprises in China. China has nearly one-quarter of the world’s
population, and it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world.
China’s GDP rose to $7.099 trillion in 2007, and China’s economy became
the “second-largest economy in the world after the U.S.”—as measured on a
purchasing power parity (PPP) basis. 10
Any international IP
commercialization or anti-monopoly strategy cannot afford to simply ignore
a nation with such a market.
¶4

After thirteen years of discussion and three revisions, China’s AntiMonopoly Law (AML) was promulgated on August 30th, 2007 and came
into effect on August 1st, 2008. It is the first anti-monopoly law in China. It
has been viewed as an “economic constitution,” 11 and a “milestone of the
¶5

7

IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, PROMOTING COMPETITION AND INNOVATION: WHAT
YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE IEEE STANDARDS ASSOCIATION’S ANTI-TRUST
AND COMPETITION POLICY 1 (2007), http://standards.ieee.org/resources/antitrustguidelines.pdf.
8
Nicholson & Liu, supra note 2.
9
Rill & Schechter, supra note 3, at 783.
10
CIA – The World Factbook , China,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/countrytemplate_ch.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
11
Paul Jones, Licensing in China: The New Anti-Monopoly Law, The Abuse of
IP Rights and Trade Tensions, XLIII (2) LES NOUVELLES: J. LICENSING
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country’s efforts in promoting a fair competition market and cracking down
on monopoly activities.” 12 However, the wording of some provisions of the
AML, including the sections dealing with IP protection, is not very clear.
Judicial interpretations and implementing regulations on the AML have not
yet appeared. This has led to a lot of uncertainty for the operations of
foreign enterprises, particularly IP related enterprises in China.

I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AML
¶6
The AML has been widely described by Chinese officials and
academics as China’s “Economic Constitution.” 13 Many believe that the
AML is a “milestone in Chinese economic policy” and a significant step
towards a real market economy in China. 14 However, some commentators
believe that the AML may also have a potential negative impact on foreign
competition in China.15
¶7
Before examining how the AML will affect IP protection in China
in detail, this iBrief will outline the law. The AML includes fifty-seven
articles and can be divided into eight chapters: Chapter I–General
Provisions; Chapter II–Monopoly Agreements; Chapter III–Abuse of
Dominant Market Position; Chapter IV–Concentration; Chapter V–
Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Powers to Restrict Competition;
Chapter VI–Investigation of Suspicious Monopoly Behaviors; Chapter VII
–Legal Liability; and Chapter VIII–Supplementary Provisions.

EXECUTIVES SOC’Y INT’L 106 (June 2008) (stating that the AML is widely
described by Chinese officials and academics as China’s “Economic
Constitution”).
12
Nie Peng, China’s First Anti-monopoly Law Takes Effect, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Aug. 1, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200808/01/content_8901182.htm.
13
Jones, supra note 11, at 2.
14
Richard Student, Note, China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: Addressing Foreign
Competitors and Commentators, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 503, 503 (2008). See also
Liu Ying, BCCC cautiously optimistic over impact on FDI of new AntiMonopoly Law, 21 CHINA IP MAGAZINE 1,
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=401 (stating British
Chamber of Commerce (BCCC) and the European Chamber of Commerce
China (EUCCC) feel cautiously optimistic on the potential impacts of the
Chinese AML).
15
Student, supra note 14, at 503 (“While the AML is a milestone in Chinese
economic policy, its substance has been particularly newsworthy for alleged
weaknesses which may have a negative impact on foreign firms and investors
doing business in China.”).
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A. Purpose of AML & Global Concerns
¶8
Article 1 of the AML sets out the purposes of the law, including: (1)
preventing and prohibiting monopolistic conduct, (2) protecting fair market
competition, (3) improving efficiency of economic operation, (4)
safeguarding consumer and public interests, and (5) promoting the healthy
development of the socialist market economy.
¶9
It is clear that the purposes of the AML are quite internationalized
and reflect global concerns. As some commentators have observed, aside
from the use of nomenclature in the last provision on socialist market
economy, “none of these would be out of place in a competition statute
outside of China.” 16 In the process of the law making, the Chinese
government has widely invited comment and feedback on AML drafts from
various international stakeholders. 17 As Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General of the Anti-Trust Division of the US
Department of Justice (DOJ), commented, the Chinese government has
demonstrated its openness to “the ideas and experiences of anti-trust law
enforcers” worldwide. 18

B. Scope of Application
¶10
In addition to covering domestic economic activities, the AML
covers commercial conduct of certain foreign and international
enterprises. 19 Chapter 1 Article 2 of the AML explicitly states that the new
law is applicable not only to “monopolistic conduct in economic activities
within the territory of P.R. China,” but also to “monopolistic conduct
outside of the territory of P.R. China” if such conduct “results in
eliminating or restricting” domestic market competition in China.20

16

Paul Jones, China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: An Economic Constitution for
the New Market Economy?, CHINA L. REP., Sept. 2007, at 3, 4,
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/IC860000/newsletterpubs/C
LRsep2007.pdf.
17
See id. at 4.
18
Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Remarks presented to the UIBE Competition Law Center Conference on
Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice: Some Comments on the Abuse-ofDominance Provisions of China’s Draft Antimonopoly Law 2 (July 21, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.pdf).
19
Daniel Sarvin, China’s Anti-Monopoly Will Have A Broad Impact Beyond
Notification, Aug. 18, 2008,
http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=7415 (see specifically the
Extra-Territorial Reach section).
20
Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 11(1), (2). (2007), available at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLa
ws/P020071012533593599575.pdf.
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¶11
Moreover, the AML explicitly provides that the legislation is “not
applicable to a business’s lawful conduct in accordance with its legitimate
IP rights.” 21 This placement of IP and anti-trust law in equal position further
evidences China’s embrace of global concerns. 22

C. Enforcement Agencies—Trinity Enforcement Model
¶12
The AML specifies that the State Council shall create two new
entities to develop and enforce the law, namely: (1) the Anti-Monopoly
Commission (AMC), 23 and (2) the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency
(AMEA). 24
¶13
The AMC does not have substantive enforcement powers. Its
responsibilities include: formulating competition policies and guidelines,
evaluating competition conditions, and coordinating enforcement
activities. 25 The State Council of China has already established an AMC at
the end of July 2008—one week before the AML took effect. 26

By contrast, the AMEA has strong enforcement powers. 27 These
include the power to inspect and investigate business and non-business
premises; and the power to obtain relevant evidence, such as seizing
documents, accounting records, electronic data, and bank account records. 28
Moreover, the AMEA may even conduct all these enforcement actions
without a court order. 29 However, the AML does not detail the structure of
the AMEA. According to the source close to the law-making process, three
government agencies, rather than a single body, will be responsible for the
enforcement of the AML: (1) the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), (2)
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and (3) the
¶14

21

Id. at art. 55.
See supra text accompanying notes 8–9. More details on IP-related provisions
in the AML will be discussed in Part III of this iBrief.
23
Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 9 (2007).
24
Id. at art. 10.
25
Id. at art. 9.
26
Peng, supra note 12, at ¶ 5.
27
Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 10, 39. (2007).
28
Id.
29
See id. at art. 39. See also Peter J. Wang, H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Yizhe
Zhang, New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, JONES DAY COMMENTARIES, ASIA,
Oct. 2007, available at
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S4662 (explaining that
“[t]he AMC itself is a compromise between the outcry for one unified
enforcement agency and the maintenance of the existing division of powers
among different authorities under the State Council”).
22
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State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC). 30 Each focuses on
different issues. 31
¶15
Under the new structure, MOFCOM is responsible for merger
review. The NDRC is responsible for monopoly agreements, particularly
price-fixing issue. The SAIC is responsible for abuses of dominant
position. 32 It will be interesting to see how this trinity model works. Some
commentators have expressed concerns, 33 and believe that the trinity
enforcement model “creates a complicated institutional framework where
conflicts are probable.” 34

On July 31, 2008, China announced that its specialized IP courts
have jurisdiction over anti-monopoly law cases. As many commentators
have pointed out, “these courts are likely to be better equipped in dealing
with complex economic concepts under competition law than China’s
general judiciary.” 35 This also arguably provides a convenient avenue to
deal with possible conflicts between IP law and the AML.
¶16

30

Peng, supra note 12.
See Wang et al., supra note 29 (noting that “many [commentators] view the
vagueness of these AML provisions as an acknowledgement of the concurrent
enforcement of the AML by three existing government agencies”).
32
Dina Kallay, Counsel for I.P. and International Antitrust, U.S. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: An International Antitrust
Convergence Perspective, Remarks at the Melbourne Law School’s “Unleashing
the Tiger? Competition Law in China and Hong Kong” Conference 1 (October
4, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/oia/speeches/081004kallaymelbourne.pdf). Moreover, the
NDRC completed a draft of the anti-price-monopoly regulations in July 2008,
which are intended to implement the AML. The SAIC has set up an independent
bureau in charge of investigation and punishment of unfair competition,
commercial bribery, smuggling and other cases that break relevant commercial
laws. See Peng, supra note 12.
33
China’s anti-monopoly law commission in force, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July
16, 2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200807/16/content_8553183.htm. See also Peng, supra note 12 (noting that Huang
Yong, an anti-monopoly consultant at the Ministry of Commerce, said “[i]t is
hoped that a unified institution comes out in the coming years, which will be
better in accordance with the country’s situation”).
34
Adrian Emch, The Antimonopoly Law and Its Structural Shortcomings,
GLOBAL COMPETITION POL’Y MAG., Aug. 8, 2008, at 2, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1221922.
35
Peng, supra note 12.
31
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D. General Prohibition Provisions—Compared with the European
Union.
Similar to the Treaty of Rome (E.C. Treaty), the AML contains
three general prohibitions. Chapter II of the AML contains a prohibition on
“monopoly agreements,” including six types of agreements among
competing entities (horizontal relationship) 36 and three types of agreements
between entities and their trading partners (vertical relationships).37 The
chapter also provides a number of exceptions relating to the purposes of the
agreements. 38 Chapter III of the AML provides a prohibition on the abuse of
a “dominant market position.” It details seven types of acts that abuses
dominant market position, such as predation, refusal to deal, exclusive
dealing, tied sales, and price discrimination. 39 It also sets out the specific
factors for determining the dominant market position of an undertaking. 40
Chapter IV of the AML focuses on “concentration activities,” such as (1) a
business merger, (2) an acquisition of control over other business operators
via asset or equity purchase, or (3) situations where a business operator
acquires control or decisive influence over other business operators by
contract or any other means.41 It set up a “reporting requirement”
mechanism. 42 For any activities that may result in a high concentration of
business power exceeding the “reporting threshold,” they must be reported
to the Agency prior to their execution. 43
¶17

¶18
It is clear that the structure of the AML provisions is similar to the
E.C. Treaty. Article 81 of the E.C. Treaty focuses on “anti-competition
treaty,” Article 82 mainly focuses on prohibiting “abuse of a dominant
position,” and Articles 86 and 87 deal with “concentration.” 44

36

See Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 13 (2007).
See id. at art. 14.
38
See id. at art. 15. More details on these exceptions will be discussed in Part
IV.B.
39
See Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 17 (2007).
40
See id. at art. 17–18.
41
See id. at art. 40.
42
See id. at art. 39. The AML has not set forth the reporting threshold within the
law itself, but rather, it provides that the threshold will be prescribed from time
to time by the State Council.
43
See id.
44
See The Treaty Establishing the European Community, Title VI, art. 81, 82,
86 & 87, (2006) available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:
PDF. See also IP/IT Update, Competition Law, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.ipitupdate.com/compec.htm (stating “EC law competition law derives from arts. 81
to 89 of the Treaty of Rome”).
37
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II. THE IMPACTS ON IP PROTECTION IN CHINA: APPLIES TO
"ABUSES" BUT NOT "LEGITIMATE" USES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Meaning of the Article 55
¶19
In addition to the above general prohibitions, the AML contains a
specific provision, Article 55, relating to IP. It provides: “This Law is not
applicable to the undertakings which use Intellectual Property Rights
according to the laws and administrative regulations relevant to intellectual
property, but is applicable to the undertakings which ‘abuse IP’ and
‘eliminate or restrict market competition.’” 45

This provision will have a profound implication on the IP protection
and enforcement in China. For the first time, it sets out the basic
relationship between the AML and IPRs in China. 46 Article 55 implies that
the laws governing IPRs are considered to be “equivalent in status” to the
AML. 47 It provides IPR holders with a safe harbor for their legitimate
conducts on exercising their IPRs. So long as the IPR holder complies with
IP related laws and regulations, the provisions of the AML will not apply. 48
Since it is a general international practice to provide legal immunity for an
entity’s lawful conduct in accordance with its legitimate IPRs, Article 55
has been deemed as “further evidence that reflects China’s embrace of
global concerns.” 49 On the other hand, the AML explicitly prevents abuse
of IPRs. As some commentators observed, although the language of Article
55 is “very general,” it has clearly presented a concept similar to “patent
misuse” under U.S. law, which prohibits a patent holder from “seek[ing] to
leverage its lawful monopoly IP rights to extend them beyond the proper
scope of the patent.” 50 Indeed, as mentioned above, the Chinese regulators
¶20

45

See Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 55 (2007).
See Jones, supra note 11.
47
See id. at 3.
48
Stated differently, Article 55 appears to recognize that the simple exercise of
IP rights, without more, will not be a violation of the AML. See Masoudi, supra
note 18, at 9 (commenting on Article 54 of the AML draft, which became
Article 55 of the AML enacted on August 30, 2008. Masoudi states that“[s]ince
the right to exclude others from using the invention is the essence of an
intellectual property right, the unilateral decision of the right holder to exclude
some or all applicants from using its protected intellectual property is the most
simple exercise of IP rights and should not be subject to antimonopoly attack as
an abuse.”).
49
See Sarvin, supra note 19.
50
See Wang et al., supra note 29. The Chinese characters used in the law,
“lanyong,” can be translated as either “abuse” or “misuse.”
46
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did try to incorporate the experience and advice of foreign stakeholders into
the law-making process of the AML. 51
¶21
Although Article 55 reflects global concerns on IP abuses and the
intersection between IP and Competition law, the language of Article 55 is
overly general. Consequently, it does not appear to apply directly to the
interpretation of IPRs, as is the case in the US. 52 Neither has it provided a
clear definition of the abuse of the IPR, nor has it detailed potential liability
for IP abuses. This creates many uncertainties for foreign entities
(particularly IP-related entities) working in China.

B. Potential Problems & Legal Risks under Article 55
¶22
The potential legal uncertainty of Article 55 has already been the
subject of much debate. Generally speaking, there are at least three major
issues.
¶23
First, questions have been raised concerning the relationship
between the general prohibitions of the AML and Article 55. For example,
is Article 55 merely designed to clarify the application of the AML in the IP
context, or does it create a wider prohibition? 53 Some commentators
believe that Article 55 may have extended the scope of the prohibition on
abusing a dominant market position to activities that non-dominant
companies carried out in an IP context. 54 IPRs do not necessarily confer an
entity dominant market position. Thus, if Article 55 is interpreted broadly,
the subject matter of the AML prohibition would arguably not only cover
entities with dominant positions but also cover entities without dominant
positions. Using Microsoft’s business operation in China as an example,
Microsoft often argues that it does not have a dominant market position
because “genuine Microsoft products have a very low market share in
China” due to widespread piracies. 55 However, if Article 55 is interpreted

51

See Part V. for more examples on this issue.
The US has not used its antitrust laws to define IP abuse. The US uses special
legal guidelines to regulate the use of IP licences. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, ANTI-TRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm [hereinafter 1995
Guidelines]. More details will be discussed in Part IV.C.
53
See Nicholson & Liu, supra note 2.
54
See id. See also Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 55 (2007) (explicitly
stating that “this Law … is applicable to the undertakings which abuse IP and
eliminate or restrict market competition,” and only applies to companies abusing
a dominant market position”).
55
Tanya Fong, Microsoft introduce novel piracy defence, ALB LEGAL NEWS,
Sept. 2, 2008, available at http://au.legalbusinessonline.com/news/breakingnews/29332/details.aspx (quoting Microsoft Global VP Zhang Yaqin).
52
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widely to include non-dominant IP companies, the “test of dominant
position” may become irrelevant in determining monopolistic actives of IP
companies. Consequently, the “piracy defense” alone will not be sufficient
to provide Microsoft with a safe harbour for monopolistic lawsuits.
Secondly, some commentators fear that Article 55 may prevent
entities from engaging in any abusive activities, such as price discrimination
and discrimination in IP licensing. 56 In other words, some commentators
believe that the AML may require that similarly favorable licenses be
granted to any other firms or licensees in the market once an IP licence is
granted to the original licensee. Some commentators pointed out, by
requiring IP holders to treat “similar third parties in a similar way,” the
AML may potentially create a compulsory IP licensing system. 57Some
commentators believe such a system may have significant negative impacts
on encouraging innovation. The right of IPR holders to refuse to grant a
license to other firms has been regarded as a “core part” of the exclusive
rights under the IP laws and is directly tied to “creating incentives for
innovation.” 58 Depriving such a right from IP holders on the ground of
harming competition may result in a diminution of their investment
incentives on research and development of IP products, and, in turn, may
“slow innovation, harming consumers and reducing productivity gains for
the economy as a whole.” 59
¶24

The third concern is about the potential impacts of Article 55 on IP
infringement proceedings in China. Many multinational companies fear that
domestic IP companies may use Article 55 to restrain foreign IP holders
from enforcing their IP against domestic competitors. 60 They may attempt
to avoid or delay infringement actions brought against them by using
Article 55 as a “defense,” and claim that bringing an infringement action
against them constitutes an abuse of IPRs or a restriction of market
competition. For example, if a company has been accused of patent
infringement in China, it may claim that the alleged patent is preventing
competition and then request the AMEA to conduct an anti-monopoly
investigation—a very time-consuming procedure. Therefore, some
commentators believe that the enactment of the AML has paved the way for
software firms in China to bring anti-trust lawsuits against Microsoft and
other foreign software companies for their business practices in China. 61
¶25

56

Nicholson & Liu, supra note 2.
Id.
58
Masoudi, supra note 18, at 9 It should be noted that the Article 54 of the draft
AML that Masoudi referred to in his remark is the Article 55 of the AML
enacted on August 30, 2008.
59
Id.
60
Wang et al., supra note 29.
61
Nicholson & Liu, supra note 2.
57
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C. Recent Development of Anti-monopoly Lawsuits and Investigations
Using Microsoft as an Example
¶26
On July 31, 2008, one day before the AML took effect, Dong
Zhengwei, a partner with Beijing-based Zhongyin law firm, submitted a
document, “Application and Proposal for Protecting Citizen Property
Rights,” 62 to the AMEA (the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the SAIC
respectively), and suggested the AMEA initiate an anti-monopoly
investigation against Microsoft. 63 He alleged that Microsoft was using its
dominant market position to manipulate software prices in China, and had
breached Articles 6, 17, and 19 of the AML, which prohibit abuse of market
dominance. 64 He further called for a $1 billion fine for Microsoft’s violation
of the AML, allowed by Article 47.65 The MOFCOM replied on August 15,
2008, informing Zhengwei that the application had been transferred to its
Treaty and Law Division.66

Microsoft has fought anti-trust disputes around the world for more
than a decade. Microsoft, the U.S. DOJ and several state governments
agreed to a settlement in 2001, which required Microsoft to share its
application programming interfaces with third-party companies, and appoint
a three-person panel to check compliance with the settlement. 67 Although
some states claimed that the sanctions were inadequate, the U.S. appeals
court unanimously approved the settlement with the DOJ in 2004. 68
¶27

62

The Chinese title of document is CHINESETEXT 1.
“CHINESETEXT2” [“Chinese Lawyer applying for an anti-monopoly
investigation against Microsoft and suggesting impose 1 billion USD fine”],
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, ¶ 17 (Aug. 17, 2008),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-08/17/content_9424867.htm.
64
Id.
65
Id. Article 47 provides: “Where any business operator abuses its dominant
market status in violation of this Law, it shall be ordered to cease doing so. The
anti-monopoly authority shall confiscate its illegal gains and impose thereupon a
fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales revenue in the previous year.” Anti-Monopoly
Law (P.R.C.) art. 47 (2007).
66
Gao, Lingyun & Tan, Xiaolan, CHINESETEXT3, [Civil Lawyer Initiating
Antitrust Lawsuits Against Microsoft], SOUTHERN CITY DAILY, ¶ 2 (Aug. 20,
2008), http://sc.stock.cnfol.com/080820/123,1764,4631746,00.shtml
67
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 2002-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,860 (D.D.C.
2002).
68
Massachusetts ex rel. v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1250 (D.C. Cir.
2004). See also, Brad Smith, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel and Corporate
Sec’y, Microsoft Corp., News Conference Regarding Ruling of U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on Antitrust Settlement Remedies
(June 30, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/bradsmith/0630AppealsRuling.mspx)
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¶28
In Europe, after losing its anti-trust case in 2004, Microsoft has
been repeatedly fined.69 Furthermore, in February 2008, the European
Union’s (E.U.) Competition Commission has levied a fine of €899
million—about $1.35 billion—against Microsoft for failing to comply with
the European Commission's 2004 anti-trust decision, which mandated
Microsoft to share interface and protocol information from its workgroup
systems with third party companies. 70 Since the 2004 decision, Microsoft
has been fined more than $2.4 billion in total by the European
Commission. 71
¶29
In Asia, Microsoft has been pursued for anti-trust violations both in
Japan and Korea. In July 2004, Japan’s Fair Trade Commission found
Microsoft in violation of Article 19 of its Antimonopoly Act for provisions
in its licensing agreement with PC makers that unduly restricted their
business operations. 72 In Korea, the Fair Trade Commission levied a fine of
$32 million against Microsoft in 2005, and ordered Microsoft to “create
versions of Windows XP that did not include Windows Media Player and
Windows Messenger.” 73
¶30
If the investigation of the Chinese AMEA (MOFCOM) is
completed and a lawsuit is filed, China will become the fifth jurisdiction to
take aim at Microsoft’s business practices, after the U.S., E.U., Japan and
South Korea.

69

On March 24, 2004, the European Commission ruled that Microsoft abused its
Windows monopoly and fined the company €497.2 million as well as ordering it
to reveal more of its software code and limiting its bundling of its software into
Windows XP. See John P. Jennings, Comparing the US and EU Microsoft Antitrust Prosecutions: How Level is the Playing Field?, 2 ERASMUS L. & ECON.
REV., 71, 78–79 (2006).
70
Geoff Duncan, EU Fines Microsoft $1.35 Billion, DIGITAL TREND, February
27, 2008, http://news.digitaltrends.com/news-article/15881/eu-fines-microsoft1-35-billion.
71
Gregg Keizer, EU Fines Microsoft Another $1.3B, COMPUTER WORLD,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&
articleId=9065018 (pointing out that “Microsoft had already been fined a total of
$1.16 billion by the EU in two previous levies, including the original March
2004 ruling and a 2006 penalty for noncompliance. Including today’s fine, the
company will have been hit with penalties that total just under $2.5 billion”).
72
Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Corporation’s Response to the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s Recommendation (July 26, 2004) (available
at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2004/Jul04/0726JFTCResponsePR.asp).
73
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http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&
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III. STRATEGIES FOR TECHNOLOGY–DRIVEN COMPANIES
¶31
Given the significance of the AML, any foreign investors and firms
who are interested in the fast-growing Chinese market need to incorporate
the requirements of the AML (including Article 55) into their future
strategic plans. 74 They should also take into account both the opportunities
and the legal risks and uncertainties brought by the AML. This iBrief will
next introduce some defenses that IPR holders may use for potential IP
abuse lawsuits, and strategies for foreign companies to use the AML to
acquire a better market position in China.

A. Non-dominant Position Defence
One of most frequently used defenses to monopoly activity is
arguing non-dominant position based on widespread piracy. As mentioned
above, when faced with the allegation that Microsoft has abused its
dominant market position to impose a monopoly price on consumers,
Microsoft argues that they do not actually have a dominant market position
due to the high piracy rate in China. 75 For example, according to the
statistics of the Business Software Association (BSA), the software piracy
rate in China in 2007 was eighty-two percent. 76 Microsoft, therefore,
claimed that it does not have actually power to conduct any monopolistic
activities such as pricing control because it obviously does not control the
entire market. 77
¶32

¶33
As such, unless Article 55 of the AML is interpreted broadly to
include non-dominant IP companies, IP companies may still use the
widespread piracy defense against anti-trust challenges.

B. New Exemptions for IP Abuse Claims—Monopoly vs. National
Development
¶34
The AML also introduced some new exemptions for companies
conducting monopolistic activities. One notable caveat in Chapter 2 of the
AML is Article 15, which authorizes a competent anti-monopoly authority

74

Sarvin, supra note19.
Fong, supra note 55.
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BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (BSA), FIFTH ANNUAL BSA AND IDC GLOBAL
SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (2007), available at
http://global.bsa.org/idcglobalstudy2007/studies/2007_global_piracy_study.pdf.
See also Press Release, Business Software Alliance, New Study Projects
Significant Economic Benefits From Reducing Software Piracy, (Jan. 22, 2008)
(available at
http://www.bsa.org/country/News%20and%20Events/News%20Archives/en/20
08/en-01222008-idcstudy.aspx).
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to approve exemptions from Articles 13 and 14 if certain monopoly
agreements among the operators are beneficial to: (1) improve technology
or research and develop new products; (2) upgrade product quality, reduce
costs, improve efficiency, unify product specifications and standards, or
realize division of work based on specialization; (3) improve operational
efficiency and enhance competitiveness of small and medium sized entities;
or (4) serve the public welfare, such as conserving energy, protecting the
environment, and providing disaster relief.78
These provisions are obviously designed to encourage foreign
investment in research and development and encourage the transfer of new
technology to China. Many foreign technology-driven companies, such as
Microsoft, Intel, Google and Dell have made investments in China and are
expected to continue investing. As some commentators observed, these
foreign companies are adopting a long term view that the Chinese
government will not restrict their business operations in China so long as
their activities do not conflict with or undermine the development of the
Chinese economy. 79 Thus, they are prepared to “continue to bring their core
technologies to China and will continue to share and/or license them to
Chinese domestic companies,” so long as China adopts practical measures
to improve IP protection. 80 Therefore, those technology-driven companies
(such as Microsoft) may use Article 15 as a potential defense against IP
abuse claims. For example, they may claim that their business operations in
China are beneficial to “improv[ing] technology or research and
develop[ing] new products” as outlined by Article 15(i). Again, Microsoft
can be used as an example in this case. Microsoft has set up the China
Research & Development Group. 81 Most recently, in November 2008,
Microsoft announced that it will invest more than $1 billion on its research
and development center in China over the next three years.82 Thus,
Microsoft may arguably use Article 15(i) as a defense for any potential IP
abuse lawsuits in China.
¶35
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Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 15(1)–(4) (2007) (translated by the author).
Liu Ying, BCCC Cautiously Optimistic Over Impact on FDI of New AntiMonopoly Law,” CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 2008, available at
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15, 2008).
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However, according to Article 15, all these exemptions are subject
to approval of a competent anti-monopoly authority. It is still unclear which
specific agency (MOFCOM, NDRC or SAIC) is the “competent antimonopoly authority” under Article 15, and will have a final power to
determine the availability of the immunity of Article 15 under the AML.
This creates another uncertainty for AML enforcement.
¶36

C. Opportunities for Consumer and Competitors
¶37
As important legislation to maintain and improve competition in the
Chinese market, the AML brings more opportunities than legal risks for
investors from different countries. It provides an opportunity for foreign
software companies (such as foreign investment companies owned by the
E.U., Korea, and Japan) to fairly compete with each other. It also enables
investors to initiate anti-monopoly investigations and lawsuits against
monopolistic activities of software giants, such as Microsoft. In doing so,
the AML helps these companies maintain and expand their market share in
China. It is clear that a fair competition environment underpinned by the
AML is good for both domestic companies and foreign investment
companies.
¶38
Public consumers will also benefit. Fair competition will provide
consumers with more affordable prices and more purchase options.83 This
may also indirectly contribute to the prevention of piracy because
consumers will have a legal, real alternative to paying for software from the
dominant player.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHINESE REGULATORS—FUTURE
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 55
A. Key Issues & Theoretical Solution
Article 55 of the AML explicitly states that the law “is applicable to
. . .” entities which “[a]buse IP and eliminate or restrict market
competition.” 84 Thus, two key questions that future regulators have to
answer when drafting judicial interpretation regulations are: (1) how to
define abuse of IP; and (2) how to determine whether a conduct of IPR
holders, such as restraints of IP licensing arrangements, has eliminated or
restricted market competition.
¶39

Regulators can start to answer these questions by drawing on
lessons from countries with advanced IP and anti-trust laws, such as the
U.S. and the E.U. It is important to understand how the E.U. and the U.S.

¶40

83
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See also Susan Ness, Preface, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 229, 230 (1999).
Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 55 (2007).
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deal with the interrelation between IP protection and enforcement of antitrust law. Yale Law School Professor Ward S. Bowman, in his book Patent
and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal (1973), has provided
a clue to deal with this issue. He said:
“[T]he anti-trust/patent conflict, as courts have assessed it, is to a large
extent illusory. It is based on a long-accepted but mistaken notion that
a legal monopoly, a patent may be used as a lever to monopolize the
unpatented. In addition, courts seem oblivious, whether or not patents
are involved, to the consumer-benefiting efficiencies derivable from
agreements sellers make with buyers concerning how, when, where,
and under what conditions a licensee may use information . . . .” 85

Bowman further listed a number of licensing arrangements that will be
found “not to be means of creating new and broader monopoly,” such as tieins, territorial licensing, functional division of use, end-product pricing, and
all-or-none offers. 86
¶41
It is clear that Bowman argues that IP rights do not necessarily
confer market power. There is no direct conflict between IP laws and antitrust law; they share common goals in enhancing innovation and consumer
welfare. Secondly, most IP licensing agreements (including restraints in IP
licensing arrangements) are “pro-competitive” rather than “anticompetitive” in nature. 87 It seems that Bowman’s view has now been
accepted by regulators in both the E.U. and the U.S.88

B. The European Union Model – Block Exemptions
¶42
In order to facilitate the enforcement of anti-trust law in the IP areas
and strike a sound balance between economic freedom and protection of
competition, the E.U. enacted its new “Technology Transfer Block
Exemption Regulation” (TTBER) in April 2004. 89 The TTBER prohibits:
(1) exclusive grant-back obligations of a licensee’s own severable
85

WARD S. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW ix (1973).
Id.
87
Bowman tried to correct at least two common misconceptions the people may
have in terms of the interrelationship between IP and anti-trust law and the
nature of IP licensing agreements. People often believe: (1) the
monopoly/exclusive rights under IP laws will definitely result in monopolistic
activities of IPR holders in the market, and (2) most of restraints in IP licensing
arrangements are anticompetitive in nature.
88
See infra Parts V.B–C.
89
See Commission Regulation 772/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11 available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:123:0011:0017:EN:P
DF [hereinafter TTBER]. TTBER replaced Commission Regulation 240/96.
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86

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 004

improvements, (2) no-challenge clauses with respect to IP validity, and (3)
restrictions on the licensee’s ability to exploit its own technology or on its
ability to develop new technology where the license is granted to a noncompetitor.90
Moreover, the E.U. noticed that, similar to Bowman’s argument,
technology licensing agreements “have positive effects that outweigh their
restrictive effects on competition.” 91 Thus, the new regulation is comprised
of “block exemption” provisions in order to strike a sound balance between
the IP protection and the protection of competition and to create “an area of
certainty for most licensing agreements.”92 The EU further enacted a very
detailed TTBER Guideline to facilitate the implementation of the TTBER
regulation. 93 The Guideline has greatly facilitated the understanding and
implementation of all provisions in the TTBER. 94 Although the AML also
includes certain similar exemption provisions, such as Article 15, for
general prohibitions of monopolistic conducts, these provisions are overly
simplified as compared with the counterparts of the TTBER regulation and
guideline.
¶43

C. The US Model—The Rule of Reason Approach
¶44
In order to improve the certainty of application of IP licensing
agreements, the U.S. DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jointly
published the Anti-trust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property in April 1995 (1995 Guidelines). 95 The Guidelines set up three
general principles for determining IP-related monopolistic activities,
reflecting Bowman’s views: (1) the Agencies regard intellectual property as
being essentially comparable to any other form of property, (2) the
Agencies do not presume that IP creates market power in the anti-trust
context, and (3) the Agencies recognize that IP licensing allows firms to

90
See TTBER, Art. 5, §§1(a)–(c), 2. See also Jones, supra note 11, at 14
(providing a summary of core prohibition provisions in TTBER).
91
See EUROPA, Technology transfer agreements,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26108_en.htm (last
visited Nov. 15, 2008).
92
Id. See also TTBER, Arts 4, §§ 1(c), 2(b). See also Commission Notice
2004/C 101/08, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty,
2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0097:0118:EN:P
DF [hereinafter TTBER Guideline].
93
See TTBER Guideline, supra note 92. The TTBER Guideline provides very
detailed instructions on applications of the TTBER and Article 81 (3) of the EC
Treaty in general.
94
Id.
95
1995 Guidelines, supra note 52.
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combine complementary factors of production and is generally procompetitive.
¶45
In line with these principles, the 1995 Guidelines adopted a more
general approach, the “rule-of-reason” approach, to evaluate restraints in
licensing arrangements. Put simply, under the “rule of reason” approach, if
the agencies or courts find a licensing restraint is likely to have both
anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects, the agencies then have to
assess whether the “restraint in question” can be expected to contribute to
an “efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity,” and evaluate
whether the efficiency-enhancing effects that the restraint may have
outweigh those anticompetitive effects. 96 In doing so, the DOJ attempts to
strike a sound balance of the “pro-competitive effects of licensing against
possible anticompetitive effects in related markets.”97
¶46
Furthermore, in order to facilitate implementation of the 1995
Guidelines and enhance the pro-competitive effects of IP licensing
arrangements, the DOJ and the FTC issued another joint document - Antitrust Enforcement & IPRs: Promoting Innovation and Competition in 2007
(2007 Report). 98 The report re-emphasized the generally pro-competitive
nature of IP licensing arrangements, 99 and reaffirmed the “rule of reason”
approach set forth in the 1995 Guidelines. Moreover, the 2007 Report
provides a detailed guideline for agencies and courts to apply the rule of
reason approach and general principles established in 1995 Guidelines to
“particular activities involving IPRs.” 100 The first two chapters of the 2007
Report focus on certain methods that an individual IPR holder might
“employ to maximize the benefits it receives from its IP.” 101 The remaining
chapters of the report focus directly on four important issues in IP licensing
practices, including: (1) how to analyze potential competitive harm that
patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements may cause; (2) how to
evaluate the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of specific types of
restrictions in IP licenses, such as non-assertion clauses, grant backs, and
reach-through royalty agreements; (3) how to evaluate anti-trust
consequences of tying and bundling of IPRs; and (4) how to evaluate the
competitive significance of restrictions that attempt to extend the temporal
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See discussion supra Part III.D.
See Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of
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98
See 2007 Report, supra note 4.
99
Id. at ch 4.
100
Id. at 4.
101
Id. at 5.
97

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 004

reach of patents. 102 Compared with the 1995 Guidelines, the 2007 Report is
much more specific, and easier to apply when resolving the IP abuse issues
in IP licensing practices.

D. General Recommendations
¶47
Below are some general lessons that the Chinese regulators may
learn from the U.S. and E.U.:

1. Forms of Regulations— Special Regulation vs. General Regulations
¶48
First, in light of proper practice, it is necessary to enact a special
legal document to regulate the enforcement of the AML law in IP areas. As
introduced above, due to the complexity of enforcing anti-trust law against
IP holders, both the E.U. and U.S. have enacted special policy documents
particularly dealing with IP abuse issues. Thus, the Chinese regulators
should also enact a special legal document to regulate the enforcement of
the AML law in IP areas, rather than make a general judicial interpretation
regulation for the implementation of the AML.
¶49
Second, it is necessary to enact a specific guideline to facilitate the
implementation and enforcement of the special legal document. As
introduced above, in addition to enacting special regulations on how to
enforce anti-trust law in IP areas, both the E.U. and the U.S. enacted
specific guidelines to interpret and facilitate the understanding and
implementation of their special regulations. For example, the 2007 Report
not only summarized the general principles and approach (the “rule of
reason” approach) to determine the pro- or anticompetitive nature of IP
licensing arrangements, but also provided specific examples 103 and
explanations of how to apply these principles to resolve specific issues in IP
licensing practices (such as tying and bundling of IPRs) and to realize the
common purposes of IP law and anti-trust law in “promoting innovation and
enhancing consumer welfare.” 104

2. Content of Regulation & Guideline—Striking a Sound Balance
¶50
Future regulations and guidelines should strike a sound balance
between IP protection and protection of competition. There are various
ways to realize such a goal. Chinese regulators may consider drawing on
lessons from both the U.S. and the E.U. approaches and develop their own
approach which suits the specific situations in China.
102

Id. at 5.
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104
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103
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¶51
First, future regulators may set up some general principles to clarify
the complementary relationship between IP protection and anti-trust law. 105
Both IP and anti-trust laws have a common goal in enhancing innovation
and consumer welfare, such as “bring[ing] new and better technologies,
products, and services to consumers at lower prices.” 106 As the U.S. D.O.J.
noted, “anti-trust does not protect competition for its own sake; instead, it
protects competition as a force that leads to increased efficiency, growth,
and consumer welfare.” 107 Thus, the final goal of the IP law and anti-trust
law is the same in enhancing technological progress and the growth of the
national economy. 108 The establishment of these general principles will
provide important guidance for the courts and the public to understand the
interrelation between IP protection and anti-trust law, particularly the “procompetitive” effects of most IP licensing arrangements. This helps correct
the common misconception that strong IP protection definitely results in
market monopoly.
¶52
Second, future regulators may learn from the E.U., and introduce
the E.U.-style “block exemption” provisions in future judicial interpretation
in order to provide the immunity for pro-competitive IP licensing
arrangements. This will not only help strike a sound balance between
economic freedom of parties and protection of competition, but will also
increase the legal certainty of IPR holders using licensing agreements. 109
This would arguably create more incentives for IPR holders to invest in
further innovation.

Third, future regulators may set up a general approach, such as the
U.S.-style “rule of reason” approach, to evaluate specific IP abuse issues in
IP licensing practices. Although the U.S. and China may have different
priorities, similar approaches may be adopted by both countries to evaluate
the competitive effects of IP licensing agreements. This type of general
approach will also help to resolve some difficult situations, which may not
have been addressed in mandatory laws (“block exemption provisions”). In
other words, the mandatory law and the “rule of reason” approach may
¶53
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work collectively to provide greater legal certainty for both IP holders and
users.
3. Enforcement Review Mechanism
¶54
Sound laws should suit specific situations of a nation. Thus, future
regulators should always take into account specific social and economic
circumstances in China, rather than uncritically importing the legislative
models used in the U.S. and the E.U. Future regulators should bear in mind
that the final goal of these regulations is to enhance innovation and growth
of the national economy. Regulators should ensure that the implementation
of new regulations and guidelines will maintain a sound market and ensure
that both domestic industries and foreign IP companies operating in China
have an equal opportunity to participate in both international and domestic
competition.
¶55
The Chinese AML was recently enacted, and Chinese courts do not
have sufficient experience in enforcing the anti-trust laws in IP areas. As
such, in addition to learning from the enforcement experiences of the EU
and the US, it would be desirable to set up a three-year review mechanism
in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the prospective IP-anti-trust
regulations and guidelines in China. Through the review mechanism, the
Chinese regulators may identify the problems of enforcement and reform
the law in a timely fashion, making sure that the laws best suit the specific
social and economic environment in China.

CONCLUSION
¶56
In conclusion, this iBrief focused on examining possible impacts of
the Chinese AML on the IP protection and commercialization in China. It
first provided a brief overview of the AML. It then examined both the
opportunities and the potential legal risks the AML creates for the business
operations of foreign IP holders and investors in China. It particularly
focused on the uncertainty brought by Article 55, and recent developments
of anti-trust disputes in which Microsoft is a party. The iBrief then provided
some practical advices and strategies for foreign IP holders/investors to
operate in China, such as using Article 15 as a defense against potential IP
abuse lawsuits. Finally, by drawing on the U.S.’s and the E.U.’s experiences
enforcing anti-trust law in IP areas, it provided some practical suggestions
for future regulators to better interpret and implement Article 55 of the
AML.

Generally speaking, the promulgation of the AML is an important
progression of China’s efforts in fighting against monopoly activities and
promoting competition. Article 55, for the first time, expressly defined the
role of the IP law in the AML. It reflected a strong intention of the Chinese
¶57
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regulators in striking a sound balance between protecting IP and
competition. However, the AML, including Article 55’s IP provision, is still
far from perfect. The lack of detailed implementing regulations and
guidelines on the interrelation of IP and competition laws has resulted in
legal uncertainty for both foreign and domestic technological companies
operating in China. In order to make future regulations strike a better
balance of protecting IP and competition, China may consider drawing on
experiences from the US and EU to develop an approach that suits its own
needs. It is imperative to make mandatory laws (the EU-style block
exemption provisions), the rule of reason approach (the US-style evaluation
approach), and national development policy (that is, public interest
exemptions) work collectively to resolve the IP abuse dilemmas. In doing
so, provide greater legal certainty for both IPR holders and public users.

